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How the Looming Fight over Termination of Transfers under § 203 of the Copyright Act
provides a Pause Point for Deeper Insights into the Current State of American Copyright Law
Jared Pickell
I.

INTRODUCTION

There is a looming deluge of litigation between musical artists and record companies for
the rights to sound recordings.1 This serves as a pause point for an examination of American
copyright law, specifically the duration of copyright protection, and how society fits into the
copyright law under the Constitution.2 The disputes involve musical artists filing notices and
bringing actions to terminate unremunerative transfers of copyrights made to record companies.3
Upon successful termination of such transfers, the rights to the music, whether as sound
recordings or musical compositions, will revert to the musicians. The first of such attempts to
terminate transfers under § 203 of the Copyright Act of 1976 arrives in 2013.4
Defining authorship in the context of a musical work is a determinative factor of these
debates, especially considering that the Copyright Act grants various rights to “authors,” but
nowhere defines the term “author.”5 The Constitutional grant of intellectual property rights
specifically mentions “authors:” “The Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”6 As a matter of public policy, American
copyright law needs to be more pro-author, and § 203 does not fully accomplish that policy.

1

Larry Rother, Record Industry Braces for Artists’ Battles over Song Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2011, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/arts/music/springsteen-and-others-soon-eligible-to-recover-song-rights.html
2
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3
Rother, supra note 1.
4
17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2006). Section 203 relates to transfers granted on and after January 1, 1978, and provides
that a copyright holder can terminate the grant at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution. Id.
5
See § 101. This section provides definitions of the terms used in the Copyright Act.
6
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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American copyright law should also encourage a robust public domain and should take
into account where society stands in the context of the copyright law. The termination-oftransfers provision of § 203 feigns being a pro-author compromise, but in reality is anything but.
Not only is § 203 not pro-author in practice; it also illustrates how much the current copyright
law allies itself with publishers and distributors to the detriment of authors. This is not only a
problem for its markedly anti-author considerations; more importantly, it ignores the notion that
the copyright system is supposed to promote the general welfare through the advancement of
ideas, knowledge, and the arts.7
This Comment will reexamine American copyright law, using § 203 and the current
battles in the music industry, to show how the copyright law has gone astray from the underlying
constitutional and philosophical justifications of copyright. It will utilize the termination-oftransfers disputes between musical artists and record companies to reexamine American
copyright law to determine: (1) why § 203 as it stands is not the optimal mechanism for solving
the underlying and overarching issues involved in these disputes; and (2) how § 203 provides a
window into how off-course American copyright law has gone. In this regard, the discussion is
framed as merely one between an artist with unequal bargaining power and a powerful record
company or other content-producing and distributing entity; the societal interest in shortening
copyright terms is conspicuously absent in the present debates. This Comment will address these
issues at length.
Part II provides historical background on American copyright law and the constitutional
power of Congress to enact copyright laws. Part III addresses relevant terminology and
background to the issues surrounding the § 203 termination provisions and briefly discusses the

7

Id.
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other termination provision in the Copyright Act under § 304.8 Part IV predicts the “winners” of
the § 203 battles, and criticizes the copyright law generally because of these anticipated
outcomes. Part V examines American copyright law through the lens of § 203 and suggests that
copyright law has lost sight of constitutional and philosophical justifications for copyright. In
addition, Part V suggests suggestions for how Congress can address and ameliorate these issues,
especially the idea of “erring” on the side of authors and being mindful that the general welfare
of society should be the driving force of American Copyright Law, under the Copyright Clause.
II.

COPYRIGHT HISTORY AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COPYRIGHT DURATION IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE ‘TERMINATION OF TRANSFERS’ PROVISIONS
American Copyright Law is grounded in the Constitution of the United States.9 The

“Copyright Clause” states: “The Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of
Science10 and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”11 Congress passed the first Act pursuant to
this Clause in 1790.12 The Act was described as “an act for the encouragement of learning,”
which gave an initial copyright term of fourteen years to “books,” as well as to maps and
charts.13 The 1790 Act also allowed for a renewal period of fourteen years if the author of the
work followed proper renewal procedures.14

8

§ 304.
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10
The term “Science” in the eighteenth century referred to what we would today call “knowledge” or “learning.”
Paul Goldstein, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 41 (Rev’d Ed. 2003).
11
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause also covers patents and is also known as the “intellectual property”
clause; this Comment will refer to it as the “Copyright Clause.”
12
See Act of May 31, 1790, 1 STAT. 124.
13
Goldstein, supra note 10, at 41.
14
Id.
9
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The Copyright Clause was, in large part, based on an earlier English law: the Statute of
Anne of 1710.15 The Statute of Anne granted protection to authors themselves for new works,
thereby seeming to break the stationers company’s historic publishing monopoly.16 This
copyright statute was originally entitled “A Bill for the Encouragement of Learning and for
securing the property of Copies of Books to the rightful Owners thereof.”17 This title18 seemed
to suggest “an intent to create a permanent and perpetual property right,” which is what the
booksellers of the stationers company wanted.19 But the statute in this form did not create such a
permanent and perpetual right.20 It included limits of protection of fourteen years for new books
and twenty-one years for those already printed, with the ability to renew the copyright for an
additional term of fourteen years if the author was still alive after the first term expired.21 The
name of the bill was later changed—in order to dispel the notion that it was to convey a perpetual
property right—to “A Bill for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed
Books in Authors, or Purchasers, of such Copies, during the Times therein Mentioned.”22
This new term limitation greatly irritated the booksellers, and they filed a petition with
Parliament in complaint, stating “if we have a Right for Ten Years, we have a Right for Ever.”23

15

“A Bill for the Encouragement of Learning by vesting the Copies of Printed Books in Authors, or Purchasers, of
such Copies, during the Times therein Mentioned,” 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710).
16
Id at 40. The stationers company was a publisher’s guild that was granted exclusive rights by English monarchs to
print and sell books, in exchange for monarchical control and censorship of the printed material. Id. The stationers
greatly resisted the Statute of Anne because it peeled back from their monopoly by giving authors rights to their
works, and because it also provided for limited terms of protection. Id.
17
Edward C. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and the Intellectual Property
Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 334–35 (2000).
18
Id. at 336 (One also simply cannot overlook the fact that the Statute of Anne contained in its title the words “an
act for the encouragement of learning.” This language was meant to put a limit on the Statute of Anne, as was the
similar language in the U.S. Constitution, “to promote the progress of Science.” The Statute of Anne was also a
statute that regulated the printing trade, and was “aimed at controlling and limiting the rampant monopolies then
extant in the booksellers trade.”).
19
Id. at 334–35.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
8 Anne, c. 19.
23
Walterscheid, supra, note 17, at 334–35.
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This petition did not lead to an amendment of the bill, and the term limit remained.24 By
rebutting the stationers’ complaints, the intent of British Parliament in the Statute of Anne, and
accordingly the intent of the Framers in the United States Constitution, was to truly grant
protection for “limited times.”25 The exact meaning of “limited times,” however, varies
greatly.26
After the original 1790 Copyright Act, the ensuing history of U.S. copyright law has
accommodated technological change by absorbing new media into various revisions of each
subsequent copyright act, affording more and more varied protection to copyright owners.27
Under the 1976 Act, “books” evolved into the category “literary works.”28 Maps and charts are
now included in the category “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”29 Music and lyrics fall
into the category “musical works” and motion pictures are classified along with “other
audiovisual works.”30 “Sound recordings” are also granted their own category.31 The advent of
the Internet and other digital technologies has required reinterpretations of the statutory language
in order to extend coverage to works in those platforms; surely the courts will need to continue
this as current technologies become more sophisticated and new technologies are developed.32
American copyright law has extended the statutory period of copyright protection in each
new Act.33 The 1831 Act increased the initial term of copyright to twenty-eight years, with a

24

Id.
Id.
26
Infra Part V.
27
Compare 1790 Copyright Act with 1831 Copyright Act, 1909 Act (17 U.S.C. (1909)), and the 1976 Act (17
U.S.C. (1976)).
28
§ 102(a) (1976).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY 10 (2004) (“The law’s response to
the Internet, when tied to changes in the technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the effective
regulation of creativity in America.”).
33
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194–95 (2003) Justice Ginsberg succinctly summarized the history of statutory
term limits at the outset of her opinion. Id. This Comment will later criticize the overall holding of the majority
25
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renewal term of fourteen years.34 The 1909 Act increased the renewal term to twenty-eight
years.35 The 1976 Act did away with the dual system of protection and adopted a unitary
copyright term defined by the life of the author plus fifty years.36 In 1998 Congress extended the
duration of copyright protection to life of the author plus seventy years.37 For works for hire
under the current act, owners of copyrights get a term the shorter of 120 years from the date of
creation or ninety-five years from first publication.38
Given the above, it is questionable whether copyright duration is in fact “for limited
times,”39 especially considering that since 1976, the Copyright Act has had a unitary term
measured by the life of the author, plus some number of years.40 Also, throughout copyright
history, there have been “tensions between the limited monopoly [granted to authors] and the
free flow of information.”41 In addition to balancing the rights of the authors of musical works
and the rights of record companies to whom such authors have transferred their rights,42 this
Comment will consider whether American copyright law overprotects artists and publishers to
the detriment of the public, as users of the artistic works, depriving the public of access to such
works.43 As James Madison wrote in The Federalist Number 43, “the utility of this power will
opinion here, as well as use dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens and Breyer to bolster this Comment’s argument.
See infra Part V.
34
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194–95.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. This additional twenty years was an amendment called the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA), which was at issue in the Eldred case. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The petitioners only challenged the
retroactivity of the CTEA, and not the length of the copyright term itself. Id. However, the dissenting opinions
address that issue, as does this Comment.
38
§ 302(c).
39
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
40
17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
41
Samuel E. Trosow, The Illusive Search for Justificatory Theories: Copyright, Commodification and Capital, 16
CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 217, 220 (2003).
42
Section 203 attempts to strike a balance between artists and the distributors within the content industries who
purchased the artists’ copyrights, by giving the artists a chance to terminate such transfers after thirty-five years, in
order for the authors to reap more monetary benefits from their work.
43
“Although a copyright belongs to an author during its term, the ultimate purpose of this bargain is not to protect
authors but rather to enrich the public domain. The cardinal principle in copyright law, then, is that any decision to
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scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain,
to be a right of common law [where] the public good fully coincides . . . with the claims of
individuals.”44
Copyright law should, in theory, incentivize authors to create, and “rights in our society
cannot depend for their justification solely upon statutory or constitutional provisions.”45 The
Supreme Court has interpreted the economic philosophy behind the “Copyright Clause” as “the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors.”46 This is consistent with Locke’s labor theory,
which states that labor should be rewarded because it adds value to goods—here, copyrightable
works of authorship.47 Labor also converts goods from their “state of nature” into property,
divining upon the laborer a possessory interest in such property.48 Goods can be held analogous
to ideas, and authors and creators labor in producing tangible expressions of ideas.49 This is
consistent with the general copyrightability requirements of “originality” and “fixation,”50 which
works must contain before authors can gain copyright protection.51
The definition of “author” is not expressly included in the Copyright Act, but an “author”
is understood to be the creator of one of the types of protectable works listed in the Act.52 As
long as the basic requirements of the law are met—originality of the idea and fixation of the idea
extend the law or to recognize new interests ought to be based on a realistic expectation that the public domain will
bear new fruit.” H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1984).
44
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
45
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 288 (1988).
46
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
47
Id. at 296–97.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” § 102(a).
51
Id.
52
§ 102(a)(1)–(8); § 103(a) (“sound recordings” are protectable under §102(a)(7)). Thus, an author would be, for
example, the writer of a novel or other literary work, the producer of a motion picture, and the writer of the music
and the lyrics of a song.
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in a tangible medium of expression—the “author” is entitled to copyright.53 While copyright
“vests” in an “author” at the moment of fixation, many musicians, as would-be “authors,” never
really hold a copyright at all because they routinely assign their rights to publishers, distributors,
and other members of content industries.54
There are two “encroachments” on the author’s place in copyright today. The first is that
authors lack bargaining power.55 The second deals with new technological avenues for creating
and disseminating works of authorship.56 New technologies call into question “whatever artistic
control the author may retain over her work.”57 An important consideration to understand here is
that “copyright is not just about getting paid; it is also about maintaining control, both economic
and artistic, over the fate of the work.”58 This consideration becomes clear when one remembers
that inherent in intellectual property law is the idea of “property” itself, that is, ownership, which
in turn implies control.59
Technology itself commodifies music and makes music property, separate from the actual
performing or playing of that music, from very simple forms of expression such as the writing of
musical notation in sheet music, to the complex digital technologies of modern sound
recordings.60 In the Middle Ages, musical notation developed into something similar to what it
is today, and the notion of the composer as author, able to make proprietary claims, as opposed

53

§ 201.
This is especially true in the music industry record deal, whereby the artist signs his rights to the record company
in exchange for the company’s services in the production, distribution, advertising, etc. of the record. Lydia Pallas
Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 697–98 (2003).
55
In the legislative history of § 203 of the 1976 Act, Congress states that the driving force of the termination of
transfer provisions was unequal bargaining power between artists and publishers or producers of works, and the
impossibility to determine a work’s value at the nascent stage of creation. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124.
56
Id.
57
Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author’s Place in the Future of Copyright, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 381, 382–83 (2009).
58
Id. at 390.
59
Id.
60
Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music is it Anyway?: How we Came to View Musical Expression as a Form of
Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405, 1451 (2005).
54

8

to mere performance rights, began to emerge.61 Following the invention of the printing press,
“music publishing began to take hold in the latter fifteenth century.”62 At this time, a composer
only had the potentiality for a copyright in his composition as printed in a book, and that book
was considered a form of property in which the musical expression was embodied.63 The
development of sheet music and perforated piano rolls in the nineteenth century were the next
major technological innovations that furthered the concept of music as property.64 These were
followed by the development and use of the phonograph in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, which were in turn followed by more sophisticated sound recording devices
and methods.65
These recording devices allowed the music recording industry to explode throughout the
twentieth century and into the twenty-first century.66 Sound recordings first received copyright
protection in 1972.67 Congress added § 203 to the 1976 Act with the purported intent to allow
“authors” who had made unremunerative transfers to terminate such transfers so that copyright
would revert back to the author.68 Section 203 illustrates how far off-track American copyright
law has gone.
III.

TERMS AND BACKGROUND TO THE § 203 DEBATES

Prominent musicians have recently made headlines on the termination of transfers issued
under § 203 of the Copyright Act.69 Bob Dylan, Tom Petty, Bryan Adams, Loretta Lynn, Kris
Kristofferson, and Tom Waits, among others, have already filed notifications with the Copyright

61

Id. at 1451.
Id. at 1456.
63
Id.
64
Lessig, supra note 32, at 108–09.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
17 U.S.C. §102(a)(7).
68
See supra note 55.
69
Rother, supra note 1.
62
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Office, showing their intentions to reclaim their copyrights under § 203.70 There certainly will
be many more musical artists who follow this example, and the litigation battle is expected to be
very intense.71 Don Henley, formally of the Eagles and founder of the Recording Artists
Coalition, has been very outspoken on behalf of musicians’ rights, framing the debate as
essentially one of fairness.72 Mr. Henley believes that artists deserve to get their copyrights back
because they created the music, that the record companies have profited enough from the music,
and that many musical artists fell victim to unequal bargaining power and youthful ignorance of
the law.73
Victor Willis, original lead singer in the group the Village People, is another high-profile
example currently making rounds in the media.74 Mr. Willis filed papers in 2011 to reclaim the
rights to the hit “Y.M.C.A.” as well as thirty-two other Village People songs.75 Mr. Willis
currently earns royalties from Village People recordings of $30,000 to $40,000 a year, but if he
successfully gains rights to the aforementioned recordings, that number would “triple or
quadruple.”76 Mr. Willis’s case also exhibits issues of “works for hire” and “joint authorship,”77
discussed below.78 While the termination provision of § 203 applies to all copyrightable works,
terminations by musical artists are particularly relevant because so much is at stake economically

70

Id.
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Larry Rother, A Village Person Tests the Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/17/arts/music/village-people-singer-claims-rights-to-ymca.html.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Infra Part III.
71
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for all parties involved.79 This is compounded by the uncertainty surrounding how § 203 will
impact the recording industry.80
The termination provision of § 203(a) states that “in the case of any work other than a
work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of
any right under a copyright” executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978 is subject to
termination by the author.81 The statutory termination right cannot be assigned or waived in
advance, and any contract clause claiming to do so is considered void, based on a theory of
unequal bargaining power, and the impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been
exploited.82 The right to terminate any transfer or assignment of a copyrighted work “is the most
important available to its author, because with that termination the author can receive the full
benefit of all her other rights.”83 Under § 106 of the Copyright Act, the exclusive rights of the
owner of a copyright in a sound recording are the right to reproduce the work,84 to prepare
derivative works,85 to distribute the work,86 and the right to perform the copyrighted work
publicly through a digital audio transmission.87
The procedures for terminating transfers under § 203 can become immensely
complicated. One exercising such rights must give advance notice between ten and two years
before the date that such transfer’s termination window begins.88 This termination window lasts
for five years, starting at the end of thirty-five years from the date of the grant; if the artist—or
79

Rother, supra note 74.
Id.
81
§ 203(a). Grants made prior to January 1, 1978 are governed by § 304, but this Comment does not address that
provision except where it can provide clarification. See § 304.
82
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124.
83
Mark H. Jaffe, Diffusing the Time Bomb Once Again—Determining Authorship in a Sound Recording, 53 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 139, 147 (2006).
84
§ 106(1).
85
§ 106(2).
86
§ 106(3).
87
§ 106(6).
88
§ 203(a).
80
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his successors in interest—does not terminate within the proper time period, the artist’s
termination rights disappear.89 The heavy procedural requirements put a high burden on the
author, and there certainly will be authors who fail to reclaim their works because they missed an
important deadline.90
Works for hire and dispositions by will do not count for § 203 purposes—if a work is
considered a work for hire, the creator of the work never owned the copyright at all.91 Regarding
grants made by joint authors, termination must be accorded by a majority vote.92 This makes the
complicated task of determining the statutory “author” of a sound recording all the more
important. Also, the grantee may continue to exploit a derivative work prepared under authority
of the grant before the grant’s termination.93 Litigating these issues makes matters even more
difficult, especially arguments over whether certain creations are works for hire or joint works.
Before discussing the ramifications of such classifications, it is necessary to understand some of
the complex terminology of copyright and the music industry.
The 1976 Act defines “sound recordings” as “works that result from the fixation of a
series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion
picture or other audiovisual work . . . .”94 A sound recording95 and the underlying musical
composition96 are each afforded separate copyright protection.97 A musical composition,98 for

89

Id.
These strict procedural requirements are inconsistent with the 1976 Act in general, which, unlike the 1909 Act,
did away with publication and notice requirements for works to gain copyright protection. Under the 1976 Act,
protection begins at the moment of fixation.
91
§ 203(a).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
§ 101.
95
§ 102(a)(7). §102(a)(7) protects the particular series of sounds collected in the ‘sound recording,’ not the song
being recorded (the ‘musical work’) nor the physical object in which the sound recording and the musical work are
embodied (the ‘phonorecord’). H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 5669.
96
§ 102(2).
97
Id.
98
Id.
90
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example, would be the melody, harmony, and lyrics as written by the composer, whereas a sound
recording is the “rendition” of the song as embodied in a phonorecord,99 including artistic
decisions made by vocalists, instrumentalists, musical directors, and recording engineers.100
Because a sound recording may arise from the varied contributions of several people, one must
determine who has a stake in the sound recording as an “author” and in what proportions.
Congress ducked this question when it passed the 1976 Act, leaving the matter to be determined
by the “employment relationship and bargaining among the interests involved.”101 The issue of
copyright ownership in a sound recording, therefore, is one that may be resolved by contract
according to the copyright law; but in practice and in the judicial treatment of such issues, it has
been decidedly more complex than mere contractual terms.102
The 1976 Act defines “joint works” as “work prepared by two or more authors with the
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole.”103 Inseparable here means that each contribution has little or no independent meaning
standing alone; interdependent means that each contribution has some meaning when standing
alone, but each achieves its primary significance because of some combination—e.g., music and
lyrics making up a song.104 Joint authors must make copyrightable contributions, and those with
non-copyrightable contributions can protect their rights through contract or assignment.105
Combining each contribution into the inseparable whole will sustain uncopyrightable ideas if the
requisite intent of the parties is that their contributions be so combined to make them joint

99

“‘Phonorecords’ are material objects in which sounds . . . are fixed by any method now known or later
developed,” which includes vinyl records, compact discs, tapes, digital MP3 files, and any other method. § 101.
100
Id.
101
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 5669.
102
Id.
103
§ 101 (2000).
104
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505 (2d Cir. 1991); see also H.R.Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 120
(1976).
105
Childress, 945 F.2d at 505.

13

authors.106 This highlights some confusion and ambiguity in determining who is a joint author,
and this has potential ramifications for § 203 termination of transfers of sound recordings
because of the unique issues of authorship presented by sound recordings. Joint owners are
treated as tenants in common, entitled to equal undivided interests in the whole work; so each
joint author has the right to use the copyrighted work as he wishes, subject to account to other
joint owners for any profits made.107 This gets especially problematic for artists trying to reclaim
their rights if the engineer/producer is an employee of a record company, potentially making
their share in the joint work amenable to the work for hire doctrine.108
The 1976 Act defines “works for hire” as “a work employed by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment.”109 The second part of the § 101 definition specifically
enumerates nine categories in which “a work specially ordered or commissioned” constitutes a
work for hire.110 While sound recordings are not listed, compilations111 are; so if an album can
be considered a compilation, sound recordings could in theory be works for hire under the
second prong.112 Usually, however, issues with works for hire and sound recordings are resolved
under the employer-employee relationship.113 In CCNV v. Reid, the Supreme Court held the
“federal common law” of agency law regarding “works for hire” governs the term
“employee.”114 If a sound recording—or any other work—is deemed a work for hire, then “the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author . . . and,
unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns

106

1 Nimmer & Nimmer, § 6.03, at 6–7.
2 Patry on Copyright § 5:7.
108
Id.
109
§ 101.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
See Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2010).
113
Id.
114
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989).
107
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all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”115 Finding that a work is a “work for hire” destroys
any hope of an artist attempting to assert termination rights because works for hire are exempt
from § 203’s reach.116
Another termination-of-transfers provision, § 304(c) applies to works that were in their
first or renewal term on January 1, 1978, and allows the author or her successors in interest to
terminate transfers made before that date, so as to recover the thirty-nine years of additional
protection added to the 1909 Act’s twenty-eight-year renewal term.117 The thirty-nine-year
extension term represents a completely new property right, and there are strong reasons for
giving the author, who is the fundamental beneficiary of copyright under the Constitution, an
opportunity to share it. In addition, § 304(d) governs terminations where the work was
subsisting in its renewal term on the date the CTEA was enacted118 if the § 304(c) termination
right had expired by that date, and the author or owner of the termination right must not have
previously exercised her § 304(c) termination right.119 If those three conditions are met, all of
the § 304(c) provisions apply to § 304(d) provisions, which in certain limited circumstances
allows the author to recapture the twenty-year period added to the CTEA.120
The copyright law in the context of the music industry is extremely complex. There are
two different types of copyright owners, those who own the copyright to the musical
composition,121 and those that own the copyright to the sound recording.122 Each of these
owners is granted numerous rights, some of which are subject to compulsory licensing

115

§ 201(b).
See § 203(a).
117
§ 304(c). (nineteen years added to 1976 Act, plus an additional twenty years added under the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act in 1998).
118
§ 201 (1998) (enacted on October 27, 1998).
119
§ 304(d).
120
Id.
121
§ 102(a)(2).
122
§ 102(a)(7).
116
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provisions.123 This complex system became even more complicated with digital distribution
technologies.124 With the current debate over § 203, there is big money at stake for both musical
artists and record companies.125 Control of the separate rights inherent in copyright allows for
various licensing opportunities, which is where holders of copyright make their money.126 A
disproportionately large number of copyrights are owned by the “Big Four”—Sony BMG,
Universal Music Group, EMI, and Warner Music Group.127 The big players of the music
industry are facing potentially devastating economic losses upon the termination of the many
transfers of rights they received starting in 1978.128 Thus, the record companies have incentives
to do whatever it takes to block the efforts by artists to reclaim their rights. The more successful
the record companies are at this endeavor, the more the notion of copyright as “promoting
Science and the useful Arts” is ignored for the sake of other considerations—namely, an
industry’s bottom line.
In the modern music industry, when a musical artist is “discovered” by a record
company, the company will extend the artist a record deal.129 In the contract, there will usually
be provisions stating both that any work produced by the artist is a “work for hire,” and that the
artist assigns all interest in any work he creates to the record company.130 The record company
will advance the artist some funds, which are recouped from record sales, and provide the artist
with use of the studio, and with producers, engineers, and other musicians.131 After the album is
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made, the record company will promote it and do its best to sell it.132 But at some point the
musical artist might have a falling out with his record label, at which point he will demand the
return of his sound recording, his artistic creation.133
The record company can then respond that the album is a “work for hire” and that the
artist never owned it at all.134 The record company can also point to the assignment clauses in
the contract.135 The company could also argue that, even if the work is not a work for hire, the
sound recording is a “joint work” produced by “joint authors.” These joint authors, in addition to
the artist trying to reclaim his rights, might consist of the producer, sound engineer, the studio
musicians, and anyone else involved in the creation of the work.136 In theory, these individuals
would all have a copyright in their contribution to the work, but, because they are often
employees of the record company—with the exception of the producer in many cases—their
portion of ownership goes directly to the company. This is why the determination of who the
author or authors of a sound recording are is exceedingly important in the current debate under §
203.
IV.

PREDICTING THE WINNERS OF THE § 203 BATTLES AND CRITICIZING THE COPYRIGHT
ACT— WHO IS THE AUTHOR OF A SOUND RECORDING
Determining the authorship of a sound recording can be extremely complex.137 The

continuing uncertainty in this regard could lead to extensive and expensive litigation, and might
also lead to forceful attempts of renegotiation. The Copyright Office’s discussion of sound
recordings states that “generally, copyright protection extends to two elements in a sound
recording: (1) the contribution of the performer(s) whose performance is captured and (2) the
132
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contribution of the person or persons responsible for capturing the sounds to make the final
recording.”138 Neither the Copyright Office nor Congress has specified which of the numerous
performers who contribute to a sound recording can claim authorship.139 Congress decided, in
the end, to leave it to “the employment relationship and bargaining among the interests
involved.”140
The Copyright Act defines a joint work as “a work prepared by two or more authors with
the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole,” and the duration of the copyright lasts until seventy years after the death of the
last surviving joint author.141 There are contrasting judicial approaches in construing this
definition. The most commonly held view is that “each individual contribution in a joint work
be independently copyrightable.”142 The Second Circuit, in Childress, adopted this approach,143
as did the Ninth Circuit.144
The Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit disagree, however, on the nature of “intent” as
understood in the definition of a joint work.145 Childress held that people are joint authors only
if both of them—or all of them if more than two people are at issue—fully intended to both
merge their contributions into one whole work and to share the rights in that work as joint
authors.146 Thus this standard looks to both objective and subjective manifestations of intent.147
The Ninth Circuit, under Aalmuhammed, requires that the “putative joint authors must make
objective manifestations of a shared intent to be coauthors,” and they do not have to have the
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subjective intent to share in the rights underlying the joint work.148 Because of this lack of
uniformity, as well as difficulties in proving either subjective or objective intent, this will be a
big point of contention in the litigation between record companies and artists. Again, this all
hinges on the concept of authorship within American copyright law, and in this context, “joint”
authorship.
With sound recordings, those with possible claims to authorship as contributors to the
work are the artist herself, the producer, the sound engineer, and any other contributing or backup musicians.149 The producer is very involved in the recording process, therefore some courts
consider producers joint authors under certain conditions. Staggers v. Real Authentic Sound
suggests that the contributions of a producer, especially when the producer exercises control of
the recording process, may constitute joint authorship.150 Producers, besides the musical artists,
probably have the strongest claim to be a joint author under the current copyright law.
A recording’s sound engineer may also have a property interest in the recording. A
sound engineer usually mixes the master recording and is “hired by either the record company or
the artist, and is often paid as an employee.”151 Thus the sound engineer’s work product could
be considered a work for hire.152 There is also some case law holding that a sound engineer for a
live performance might be a joint author of the accompanying sound recording.153 In theory at
least, under the current system, if a sound engineer can be considered a joint author, and the
sound engineer’s contribution to the sound recording was a work for hire, then the rights of a
sound engineer in a sound recording could have gone to the record company. This gives the
148

Jaffe, supra note 83, at 177 (citing Aalmuhammed 202 F.3d at 1234).
See § 101.
150
Staggers v. Real Authentic Sound, 77 F. Supp. 2d 57, 63 (D.D.C. 1999); see also Shady Records v. Source
Enterprises, 351 F. Supp. 2d 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
151
Jaffe, supra note 83, at 172.
152
Id.
153
Systems XIX v. Parker, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1228 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
149

19

record company more power at the expense of the musical artist because a majority of joint
authors are required to agree to terminate transfers.154 If courts allow record companies to retain
copyrights under this theory, the public and the copyright law will be greatly damaged because
this does not square well with the Copyright Clause and its purpose of “promoting Science and
the useful Arts.”155
Other possible joint-author claimants are those instrumentalists and vocalists that
contribute to a recording as back-up musicians. There are many instances where a record
company employs these individuals and thus if they had a joint authorship stake, it would belong
to the record company as a work for hire. But the case of Ulloa v. Universal Music shows the
potentiality for the “chaotic and uncertain litigation that can ultimately result if the performances
are not deemed works for hire.”156 Ulloa was an unsigned vocalist who happened to visit Shawn
Carter’s (Jay-Z’s) recording studio on the day that he was recording a song that later became a
hit.157 Ulloa sang a short vocal phrase in the song for Carter, who later used it in the
recording.158 The two never discussed any terms, and after the song became a huge hit, Ulloa
brought an infringement action against Carter and Universal, as well as a claim that she was a
joint author of the song.159 The court denied Ulloa’s claim for joint authorship, under the
Childress standard of intent, holding that Carter showed no intent to share in the authorship of
the song in question.160 The court found, however, that Ulloa did have a claim for infringement
since she contributed a copyrightable expression.161
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According to the current state of the law, musical artists and producers who exercised
significant control in the recording process will most likely be deemed coauthors of a sound
recording. The claims of the other individuals who contributed to the sound recording, while
tenable, most likely will not resolve in a finding of joint authorship by the courts.162 Joint
authorship could be found in certain circumstances—for instance, if any of those individuals
contributed a large amount to the sound recording and the requisite intent was found under the
“easier” standard of Aalmuhammed.163 Because of the divisibility of copyright implicit in joint
authorship, even if the artist successfully terminates his transfer under § 203, the rights received
might be a mere fraction of the copyright as a whole, with the rest going to the other joint
authors—assuming a majority authorized the termination.164 In addition, musical artists face
formidable opponents in record companies that have every incentive to prevent the musicians
from successfully exercising their rights under § 203.165
A somewhat novel argument that record companies could make under current law
revolves around “compilations.”166 Record companies could argue that the second part of the
work-for-hire definition applies to musical recording artists, and that an album is a compilation
for the purposes of defining copyright ownership.167 The statutory definition of works for hire
includes compilations, and at least one court has held that a musical album is a compilation for
infringement purposes.168 In Bryant, plaintiffs-appellants appealed the district court’s grant of a
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single statutory damage award for each album infringed by defendant-appellee, even though the
appellants had properly obtained and registered a copyright in each individual song on the
album.169 Appellants argued that each song on each album qualified as a separate work since
each song had its own copyright, and that the infringing appellee sold the songs individually.170
The Second Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the district court, relying on the
Conference Report accompanying the Copyright Act.171 The report stated that a compilation
results from the process of selecting and arranging preexisting material of all kinds, “regardless
of whether . . . the individual items in the material have been or ever could have been subject to
copyright.”172 The court went on to state that an album fits into the definition of a compilation
because it is a “collection of preexisting materials—songs—that are selected and arranged by the
author in a way that results in an original work of authorship—the album.”173 Appellants also
argued that because each song has “independent economic value” and was sold separately as
well as in conjunction with the albums, there should have been a statutory damage award for
each song.174 The court rejected this argument by construing the language of the statutory
damages provision to not allow for such reasoning.175
If an album is a “compilation” for copyright purposes, record companies may be able to
argue that an album is “a work specially ordered or commissioned” and constitutes a work for
hire under the second part of the work for hire definition—this ordinarily cannot be done because
“sound recording” is not one of the enumerated works here.176 The fact that record companies,
under the current statutory and case law, stand a chance to succeed on this theory, illustrates the
169
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strong impetus for reexamining our copyright scheme. This reexamination needs to not only
strengthen authors’ rights, but also needs to be mindful that in order to “promote the Progress of
Science,” Congress must consider the rights of society in general.177
This all has to be weighed against a proper construction of the important language in the
Copyright Clause, “for limited times.”178 The fact that record companies stand a chance to retain
copyright to a work authored by other individuals thirty-five years after the work’s creation—
and continuing much longer under the relevant statutory period—illustrates just how off-track
the copyright law has become. Freedom of contract principles should not be allowed to override
the Constitution, and copyright law needs to take this into account—the current copyright term
greatly
exceeds the economic incentive necessary to spur significant creative activities.
Such long terms largely reflect a focus on protecting the property rights of the
copyright owner without regard to the ultimate underlying goal of copyright,
which is to enable the public to gain free and unhindered access to creative
endeavors.179
It is worthwhile to note that in 1999, Congress amended the Copyright Act so that sound
recordings fit within the definition of “works for hire.”180 But only months later, Congress
repealed the amendment after an outcry by recording artists.181 “Because our Constitution was
designed to protect genuine authors, the legal fiction of corporate ‘authorship’ as embodied in
the work-for-hire doctrine should be limited to situations where it is necessary to properly
provide for the ‘progress of the arts’ and to reward creators.”182 Record companies’ efforts to get
a work declared a work for hire and thus block a recording artist’s attempt to reclaim her rights
177
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are not done pursuant to the “progress of the arts,” and therefore violate the constitutional
language.183 But under the current copyright scheme, record companies attempting to use the
works for hire provision in such a way is perfectly legal.184 This is why Congress must revise
the Copyright Act so that it comports with the Constitution and copyright theory; specifically,
“authors” should be given rights to their creative works, “for limited times,” and for the purpose
of promoting knowledge, learning, and the general welfare of society.
Furthermore, the public should be the primary beneficiary of any copyright statutory
scheme. When the public is in fact the primary beneficiary because creativity and progress are
being promoted, the public’s and the author’s economic interests become aligned. Essentially,
society is willing to allow creators of artistic works a limited monopoly of limited duration to
incentivize those authors and others in the promotion of progress and knowledge.
V.

EXAMINING AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW THROUGH THE LENS OF § 203

The divisiveness surrounding § 203 and terminating copyright transfers in the music
industry provides an opportunity to critique the current state of American copyright law. In the
context of the music industry, copyright law today provides too much protection to a small
number of very large and economically powerful record companies. There are four major record
companies that dominate the industry and all are members of the Record Industry Association of
American (RIAA), “a group with significant influence in the music industry and in Congress.”185
It is these record companies who reap enormous profits from our copyright law because the
duration of the copyright term is so long. The author’s life plus seventy years is not a “limited
time” and it gives copyright holders too much time to economically exploit a copyrighted
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work.186 In addition, such lengthy protection is not needed in order to promote the progress of
knowledge for the sake of the general welfare.187
A. THE PROBLEM WITH FRAMING THE § 203 DEBATES IN PURELY ECONOMIC TERMS
The free transferability of intellectual property rights allows for the author to benefit
economically upon transferring those exclusive rights.188 Since copyright contains an infinitely
divisible “bundle of rights,” authors can freely license any part of their rights to a particular work
to anyone else to use according to the terms of a contract.189 This is where copyright is lucrative
economically. But the fact that the dialogue is framed only in economic terms illustrates that the
copyright system has gone astray and is ignoring the justification for incentivizing creators: to
increase the public welfare and to promote knowledge, ideas, and the arts to better society.190
As the duration of protection under the copyright law becomes further extended, the
public’s benefit begins to decrease because the public has less access—from an economic
standpoint—to the work. The bargain has changed, and works are deferred from entering the
public domain. This is allowable up to a certain point, namely, for “limited times,” but the
current statutory periods far exceed such language.191 The music industry and other content
industries rich in copyright ownership are very powerful and continue to successfully lobby
Congress for their favor.192 For “each time copyrights are about to expire, there is a massive
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amount of lobbying to get the copyright term extended” whereby record companies argue that
they “promote Progress.”193
But the argument that record companies “promote Progress” by enabling the production
and distribution of sound recordings as musical albums only goes so far. Under the current
copyright law, copyright in works for hire last the shorter of ninety-five years from publication
or 120 years from creation.194 Even assuming a record company published a work immediately
after its creation, the copyright lasts ninety-five years, which is far too long for a monopoly in a
work at the public’s expense. So too does the duration of copyright for those works not works
for hire—seventy years after the author’s death.195 When musical and other artistic works
become merely an “undifferentiated product,” the work of art becomes valued only for its
profitability, without regard for its potential contribution to knowledge and learning, and to
aesthetics.196 This mentality, driven by the content industries, removes the social bargain aspect
of the Copyright Clause from the equation and illustrates further that the terms of copyright
protection are too lengthy.197
There has also been an increasing “concentration and integration of media”198 throughout
the twentieth century.199 The four largest recording labels200 control 84.8 percent of the
American music market, and the five largest cable companies account for seventy-four percent of
American cable subscribers.201 This “narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product
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of such large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous. Increasingly safe.
Increasingly sterile.”202 The limited monopolies under the Copyright Clause clearly took into
account that economics and market forces play a role in the balance between stimulating
creativity and maintaining a robust public domain.203 But the Framers did not intend to make
economics and bottom-lines the driving force of the copyright system.204 Rather, they intended
that intellectual property law be used to promote the general welfare and to aid in the betterment
of society as a whole.205 This is forgotten in many instances, as copyrighted works have become
merely “the object of a market transaction devoid of any other use or value besides profit.”206
The Supreme Court stated in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken that
the limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly, like the limited
copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest: creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded,
but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts.207
When the terms of copyright protection are no longer for “limited times,” the purposes of
promoting knowledge and the useful arts not only cease to exist, but are negated.208
Justice Breyer’s dissent from Eldred v. Ashcroft aptly states the premise under which this
Comment argues is an adequate alternative that Congress should undertake.209 After numerous
citations to the history of the copyright law in the United States and England, as well as citations
to case law and the House Reports from both the 1909 Act as well as the Berne Convention
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Implementation Act of 1988, Justice Breyer makes a strong policy argument for limited
copyright protection.210 He operates from the following initial assumptions:
We should take the following as well established: that copyright statutes must
serve public, not private ends; that they must seek “to promote Progress” of
knowledge and learning; and that they must do so both by creating incentives for
authors to produce and by removing the related restrictions on dissemination after
expiration of a copyright’s ‘limited Time.’211
Justice Breyer goes on to assert that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998 (CTEA) seeks, as its primary legal effect, to “grant the extended term not to authors, but to
their heirs, estates, or corporate successors.”212 The CTEA’s “practical effect is not to promote,
but to inhibit, the progress of Science.”213 For the motivation for the creativity of authors is the
reward of limited exclusive use to the authors of their creative works.214 Since this reward is the
means to spur creativity, and not an end of the creativity, the reward is limited so that its
beneficiaries, the public, “‘will not be permanently deprived of the fruits of an artist’s
labors.’”215 Life of the author plus seventy years deprives the public from the fruits of an artist’s
labor and ignores the constitutional impetus for copyright protection—to promote the general
welfare.216
B. COPYRIGHT LAW AND § 203 MUST PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE
When the impetus for copyright protection becomes overly commodified, and the
underlying rationale of promoting knowledge and the arts becomes marginalized, copyright law
loses site of the importance to fortify society with a large public domain and a large cultural
commons with aesthetic and intellectual value, and not just commercial value. There is an
210
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inherent aesthetic quality and value to the arts that is completely separate from the ability of art
to be exploited economically. When commercial value becomes the dominant force in the
creation of art, the aesthetic quality of creative works suffers. While American copyright law
needs to provide financial incentives to “authors,” those incentives must be directed in such a
way that does not ignore that such incentives exist for the purpose of promoting the general
welfare and for creating a society rich in culture and knowledge.
The termination-of-transfers provision of § 203 is only good public policy insofar as it
allows authors to reclaim the rights to their creations through operation of law. Section 203,
however, does nothing to change the excessively long duration of copyright protection. The
economic benefit seems to be that, assuming a musician can leap through the procedural and
litigation hurdles and reclaim his copyright, he will benefit from said copyright through the
duration of his life, and his heirs or devisees will reap the full benefit for seventy additional
years.217 This is beneficial to society, from a fairness standpoint, only to the extent that it
disallows record companies, who used unequal bargaining power to gain artists’ copyrights, to
continue benefiting from the work. There is indeed a congressional view that “a primary
rationale for extending the copyright term is to assure authors and their dependents ‘a fair
economic return.’”218 But again, seventy years after the death of the author is not a “limited
time,” and § 203 does not take this into account.
Furthermore, Congress has authorized a copyright term that can extend over five times
longer than the patent term.219 The first copyright and patent statutes, both enacted in 1790,
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contained terms of protection of fourteen years.220 Now, the statutory term for patents is twenty
years, while the term for copyrights is the life of the author plus an additional seventy years, or
for works for hire, the shorter of ninety-five years after publication or 120 years after creation.221
Using as a baseline for the copyright term of ninety-five years, since 1790 “the statutory patent
term has increased by 43% but the statutory copyright term has increased by almost 580%.”222
One might make the counterargument that patentable inventions, for example, drugs and
other devices for public health, have more important uses to society than works of authors
governed by copyright. But this does not justify the large gap between copyright and patent
terms of protection.223 While a life-saving drug might have more immediate impact on society
than a book or a sound recording, a person inventing such a drug needs the requisite
knowledge—an idea expressed in a tangible form of expression, governed by copyright law.
Even without making a value judgment between patented works and copyrighted works, the
Constitution’s “intellectual property clause” refers to both patents and copyrights.224 Thus, the
difference in statutory terms of protection between patents and copyright is especially illustrative
of how far off track copyright law has gotten, and this is detrimental to the public welfare.
In the legislative history of § 203 of the 1976 Act, Congress stated that the driving force
of the termination-of-transfer provisions was unequal bargaining power between artists and
publishers or producers of works, and the impossibility to determine a work’s value at the
nascent stage of creation.225 But if unequal bargaining power was really a concern of Congress
here, why allow the party with the upper hand, the publishers, thirty-five years to exploit the
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copyrighted creation?226 Section 203 fails to properly restore the balance of bargaining power in
copyright because it does not take thirty-five years to determine the market value of music sound
recordings.
In addition, § 203 and the 1976 Act copyright extensions fail to fully take into account
the public’s stake in the copyright equation. For in the promotion of “the Progress of Science
and Useful Arts,” for whom should the benefits of such promotion be made if not for the society
generally?227 Indeed, “market mechanisms should facilitate creativity and move from protecting
economic interests of copyright owners to ensuring authorship flourishes as well as enable
greater author-reader connections.”228 Here, author-reader can be substituted with a broader
concept—author as creator of any artistic work, and reader as the one who uses, enjoys, and
absorbs such works.229 Having a copyright law that heavily favors the content industries—in
lieu of a more author-friendly statutory scheme—“creates a market for literary and artistic work
that does not encourage the development of authorship and the process of creativity needed for
the production of works for the public.”230
When the incentives that Congress was supposed to provide to authors to create artistic
works—those that should advance knowledge and advance the arts—devolve into purely
economic incentives for those companies exploiting the arts, there is a problem. Further, when
publishers exploit artistic works for purely economic incentives, knowledge and the arts are not
progressing to their fullest extent. Because publishers have made large investments in searching
for exploitable works, producing them, and distributing them, “any form of enjoyment by the
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public is an externality that must be internalized to ensure that the investment made in the work
is fully recovered.”231 Again, this ignores the interest of the public welfare within the copyright
scheme.
C. SUMMARY
While copyright law needs to encourage economic investment in the production of
copyrightable works in order to incentivize authors and creators, Congress must balance this
against ensuring some underlying aesthetic quality of such works. But the driving force for
publishers and the content industry is not artistic integrity or aesthetic quality, but rather, that
they receive an acceptable return on their investment.232 The free market forces that influence
this equation are necessary and are what makes the copyright system function properly.233 When
copyright protection is too robust in favor of content industries, however, the public suffers and
is deprived of creative works in two ways. The first is that long copyright terms prevent works
from entering the public domain for far too long. The second is that those artistic works, denied
entry into the public domain, are also aesthetically and qualitatively anemic. When knowledge
and learning suffer, the public suffers.
VI.

CONCLUSION

With the current debate regarding the § 203 provisions, we will see the record companies
using the full extent of their arsenal to retain their ownership of sound recordings. This
ownership will be at the direct expense of the authors who unwittingly assigned away their rights
to their creations, and ultimately, at the expense of the public domain and of society as a whole.
This cannot stand. Our copyright law needs to reflect other values besides economic and
commercial bottom lines. The Constitution demands it, as do any sound intellectual property
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theories. How we define authorship is a determinative factor of these debates, especially
considering the constitutional language of granting, for limited times, rights “to Authors” to
“promote the progress of Science.” Our copyright law not only needs to be more pro-author and
pro-artist, but also “pro-public domain,” and needs to take into account where society stands in
the context of the copyright law—that intellectual property in general is “considered [to be] a
social bargain in which inventors and writers are rewarded for their ideas and expression, on the
condition that their creations eventually will be freely available to everyone.”234 These policies
and those mentioned above need to be the driving force of our copyright law.
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